Battle of Okinawa
The end of World War II
Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945, my 1st Marine Division invaded the island of Okinawa. It was the last Pacific island infected with Japanese soldiers before invading mainland Japan.
Okinawa was the largest
amphibious assault in the Pacific War of World War II. The 82-day-long battle
lasted from early April until mid-June 1945. After a long campaign of island
hopping, the Allies were approaching Japan, and planned to use Okinawa, a large
island only 340 miles away from mainland Japan, as a base for air
operations on the planned invasion of Japanese mainland (coded Operation
Downfall .
Four divisions of the U.S. 10th Army (the 7th, 27th, 77th, and
96th) and two Marine Divisions (the 1st and 6th fought on the island. Their
invasion was supported by naval, amphibious, and tactical air forces.
The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, and
tetsu no ame ("rain of steel") or tetsu no bofu ("violent wind of
steel") in Japanese. The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the
intensity of kamikaze attacks from the Japanese defenders, and to the
sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island.
The battle resulted in the highest number of casualties in the Pacific Theater
during World War II. Based on Okinawan government sources, mainland Japan lost
77,166 soldiers, who were either killed or committed suicide, and the Allies
suffered 14,009 deaths (with an estimated total of more than 65,000 casualties
of all kinds). Simultaneously, 42,000-150,000 local civilians were killed or
committed suicide, a significant proportion of the local population. The atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused Japan to surrender less than two
months after the end of the fighting on Okinawa.
Although Allied land forces were entirely composed of
U.S. units, the British Pacific Fleet (BPF; known to the U.S. Navy as Task Force
57) provided about ? of Allied naval air power (450 planes). It comprised a
force which included 50 warships of which 17 were aircraft carriers, but while
the British armored flight decks meant that fewer planes could be carried in a
single aircraft carrier, they were more resistant to kamikaze strikes.
Although all the aircraft carriers were provided by Britain, the carrier group
was a combined British Commonwealth fleet with British, Canadian, New Zealand
and Australian ships and personnel. Their mission was to neutralize Japanese
airfields in the Sakishima Islands and provide air cover against Japanese
kamikaze attacks. Most of the air-to-air fighters and the small dive
bombers and strike aircraft were U.S. Navy carrier-based airplanes. The U.S.
Navy sustained greater casualties in this operation than in any other battle of
the war.
Japanese
The Japanese land campaign (mainly defensive) was
conducted by the 67,000-strong (77,000 according to some sources) regular 32nd
Army and some 9,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) troops at Oroku naval base
(only a few hundred of whom had been trained and equipped for ground combat),
supported by 39,000 drafted local Ryukyuan people (including 24,000 hastily
drafted rear militia called Boeitai and 15,000 non-uniformed laborers).
In addition, 1,500 middle school senior boys organized into front-line-service
"Iron and Blood Volunteer Units", while 600 Himeyuri Students were organized
into a nursing unit. The Japanese had used kamikaze tactics since the
Battle of Leyte Gulf, but for the first time, they became a major part of the
defense. Between the American landing on 1 April and 25 May, seven major
kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes.
The 32nd Army initially consisted of the 9th, 24th, and 62nd Divisions, and
the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 9th Division was moved to Taiwan prior
to the invasion, resulting in shuffling of Japanese defensive plans. Primary
resistance was to be led in the south by Lt. General Mitsuru Ushijima, his chief
of staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Cho and his chief of operations, Colonel
Hiromichi Yahara. Yahara advocated a defensive strategy, whilst Cho advocated an
offensive one. In the north, Colonel Takehido Udo was in command. The IJN troops
were led by Rear Admiral Minoru Ota. They expected the Americans to land 6?10
divisions against the Japanese garrison of two and a half divisions; the staff
calculated that superior quality and numbers of weapons gave each U.S. division
five or six times the firepower of a Japanese division; to this would be added
the Americans' abundant naval and air firepower.
Naval battle
The United States Navy's Task Force 58, deployed to the east of Okinawa with
a picket group of from 6 to 8 destroyers, kept 13 carriers (7 CV and 6 CVL) on
duty from 23 March to 27 April and a smaller number thereafter. Until 27 April,
from 14 to 18 converted carriers (CVE's) were in the area at all times, and
until 20 April British Task Force 57, with 4 large and 6 escort carriers,
remained off the Sakishima Islands to protect the southern flank. The protracted
length of the campaign under stressful conditions forced Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz to take the unprecedented step of relieving the principal naval
commanders to rest and recuperate. Following the practice of changing the fleet
designation with the change of commanders, U.S. naval forces began the campaign
as the U.S. 5th Fleet under Adm. Raymond Spruance, but ended it as the 3rd Fleet
under Adm. William Halsey.
Japanese air opposition had been relatively light during the first few days
after the landings. However, on 6 April the expected air reaction began with an
attack by 400 planes from Kyushu. Periodic heavy air attacks continued through
April. During the period 26 March-30 April, 20 American ships were sunk and 157
damaged by enemy action. For their part, the Japanese had lost up to 30 April
more than 1,100 planes in the battle to Allied naval forces alone. Between 6
April and 22 June, the Japanese flew 1,465 kamikaze aircraft in
large-scale attacks from Kyushu, 185 individual kamikaze sorties from
Kyushu, and 250 individual kamikaze sorties from Formosa. When U.S.
intelligence estimated 89 planes on Formosa, the Japanese had approximately 700,
dismantled or well camouflaged and dispersed into scattered villages and towns;
the U.S. Fifth Air Force disputed Navy claims of kamikaze coming from
Formosa. The ships lost were smaller vessels, particularly the destroyers of the
radar pickets, as well as destroyer escorts and landing ships. While no major
Allied warships were lost, several fleet carriers were severely damaged.
Land-based motorboats were also used in the Japanese suicide attacks.
Operation
Ten-Go
Operation Ten-Go (Ten-go
sakusen) was the attempted attack by a strike force of ten Japanese surface
vessels, led by the super battleship Yamato and commanded by Admiral
Seiichi Ito. This small task force had been ordered to fight through enemy naval
forces, then beach themselves and fight from shore using their guns as coastal
artillery and crewmen as naval infantry. The Ten-Go force was spotted by
submarines shortly after it left the Japanese home waters, and was intercepted
by U.S. carrier aircraft. Under attack from more than 300 aircraft over a
two-hour span, the world's largest battleship sank on 7 April 1945 after a
one-sided battle, long before she could reach Okinawa. U.S. torpedo bombers were
instructed to aim for only one side to prevent effective counter flooding by the
battleship's crew, and hitting preferably the bow or stern, where armor was
believed to be the thinnest. Of Yamato's screening force, the light cruiser
Yahagi a four of the eight destroyers were also sunk. In all, the
Imperial Japanese Navy lost some 3,700 sailors, including Admiral Ito, at the
relatively low cost of just 10 U.S. aircraft and 12 airmen.
British Pacific
Fleet
The British Pacific Fleet, taking part as Task Force 57, was assigned the
task of neutralizing the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Islands, which it
did successfully from 26 March-10 April. On 10 April, its attention was shifted
to airfields on northern Formosa. The force withdrew to San Pedro Bay on 23
April. On 1 May, the British Pacific Fleet returned to action, subduing the
airfields as before, this time with naval bombardment as well as aircraft.
Several kamikaze attacks caused significant damage, but since the British
used armored flight decks on their aircraft carriers, they only experienced a
brief interruption to their force's objective.
Land battle
The land battle took place over about 81 days beginning on 1 April 1945. The
first Americans ashore were soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division, who landed
in the Kerama Islands (Kerama Retto), 15 mi (24 km) west of Okinawa on 26 March.
Subsidiary landings followed, and the Kerama group was secured over the next
five days. In these preliminary operations, the 77th Infantry Division suffered
27 dead and 81 wounded, while Japanese dead and captured numbered over 650. The
operation provided a protected anchorage for the fleet and eliminated the threat
from suicide boats.
On 31 March, Marines of the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance
Battalion landed without opposition on Keise Shima, four islets just 8 mi
(13 km) west of the Okinawan capital of Naha.
155 mm (6.1 in) "Long Tom"s went ashore on the islets to cover operations on
Okinawa.
Northern Okinawa
The main landing was made by XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps on the
Hagushi beaches on the western coast of Okinawa on L-Day, 1 April, which
was both Easter Sunday and April Fools' Day in 1945. The 2nd Marine Division
conducted a demonstration off the Minatoga beaches on the southeastern coast to
confuse the Japanese about American intentions and delay movement of reserves
from there.
The 10th Army swept across the south-central part of the island with relative
ease by World War II standards, capturing the Kadena and the Yomitan airbases
within hours of the landing. In light of the weak opposition, General Buckner
decided to proceed immediately with Phase II of his plan the seizure of northern
Okinawa. The 6th Marine Division headed up the Ishikawa Isthmus and by 7 April,
had sealed off the Motobu
Peninsula.
Six days later on 13 April, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment reached
Hedo Point (Hedo-misaki) at the northernmost tip of the island. By this point,
the bulk of the Japanese forces in the north (codenamed Udo Force) was
cornered on the Motobu Peninsula. Here, the terrain was mountainous and wooded,
with the Japanese defenses concentrated on Yae-Take; a twisted mass of rocky
ridges and ravines on the center of the peninsula. There was heavy fighting
before the Marines finally cleared Yae-Take on 18 April.
Meanwhile, the 77th Infantry Division assaulted Ie Island (Ie Shima)?a small
island off the western end of the peninsula?on 16 April. In addition to
conventional hazards, the 77th Infantry Division encountered kamikaze
attacks, and even local women armed with spears. There was heavy fighting before
Ie was declared secured on 21 April and became another air base for operations
against Japan.
Southern Okinawa
While the 6th Marine Division cleared northern Okinawa, the U.S. Army 96th
Infantry division and 7th Infantry Division wheeled south across the narrow
waist of Okinawa. The 96th Infantry Division began to encounter fierce
resistance in west-central Okinawa from Japanese troops holding fortified
positions east of Highway No. 1 and about 5 mi (8.0 km) northwest of Shuri, from
what came to be known as Cactus Ridge.
The 7th Infantry Division encountered
similarly fierce Japanese opposition from a rocky pinnacle located about
1,000 yd (910 m) southwest of Arakachi (later dubbed "The Pinnacle"). By the
night of 8 April, U.S. troops had cleared these and several other strongly
fortified positions. They suffered over 1,500 battle casualties in the process,
while killing or capturing about 4,500 Japanese, yet the battle had only just
begun, for it was now realized they were merely outposts guarding the Shuri
Line.
The next American objective was Kakazu Ridge, two hills with a connecting
saddle that formed part of Shuri's outer defenses. The Japanese had prepared
their positions well and fought tenaciously. The Japanese soldiers hid in
fortified caves. The U.S. forces often lost men before clearing the Japanese out
from each cave or other hiding place. The Japanese sent Okinawans at gunpoint
out to acquire water and supplies for them, which led to civilian casualties.
The American advance was inexorable but resulted in a high number of casualties
on both sides.
As the American assault against Kakazu Ridge stalled, Gen. Ushijima,
influenced by Gen. Cho, decided to take the offensive. On the evening of 12
April, the 32nd Army attacked U.S. positions across the entire front. The
Japanese attack was heavy, sustained, and well organized. After fierce close
combat the attackers retreated, only to repeat their offensive the following
night. A final assault on 14 April was again repulsed. The effort led 32nd
Army's staff to conclude that the Americans were vulnerable to night
infiltration tactics, but that their superior firepower made any offensive
Japanese troop concentrations extremely dangerous, and they reverted to their
defensive strategy.
The 27th Infantry Division?which had landed on 9 April?took over on the
right, along the west coast of Okinawa. General John R. Hodge now had three
divisions in the line, with the 96th in the middle, and the 7th on the east,
with each division holding a front of only about 1.5 mi (2.4 km). Hodge launched
a new offensive of 19 April with a barrage of 324 guns, the largest ever in the
Pacific Ocean Theater. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers joined the
bombardment, which was followed by 650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the
enemy positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns. The Japanese
defenses were sited on reverse slopes, where the defenders waited out the
artillery barrage and aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves
to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward
slope.
A tank assault to achieve breakthrough by outflanking Kakazu Ridge, failed to
link up with its infantry support attempting to cross the ridge and failed with
the loss of 22 tanks.
Although flame tanks cleared many cave defenses, there was
no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps lost 720 men KIA, WIA and MIA. The losses
might have been greater, except for the fact that the Japanese had practically
all of their infantry reserves tied up farther south, held there by another
feint off the Minatoga beaches by the 2nd Marine Division that coincided with
the attack.
At the end of April, after the Army forces had pushed through the Machinato
defensive line,[22] the 1st Marine
Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division, and the 77th Infantry Division
relieved the 7th. When the 6th Marine Division arrived, III Amphibious Corps
took over the right flank and 10th Army assumed control of the battle.
On 4 May, the 32nd Army launched another counteroffensive. This time,
Ushijima attempted to make amphibious assaults on the coasts behind American
lines. To support his offensive, the Japanese artillery moved into the open. By
doing so, they were able to fire 13,000 rounds in support but an effective U.S.
counter-battery fire destroyed dozens of Japanese artillery pieces. The attack
failed.
Buckner launched another American attack on 11 May. Ten days of fierce
fighting followed. On 13 May, troops of the 96th Infantry Division and 763rd
Tank Battalion captured Conical Hill. Rising 476 ft (145 m) above the Yonabaru
coastal plain, this feature was the eastern anchor of the main Japanese defenses
and was defended by about 1,000 Japanese. Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, the
1st and 6th Marine Divisions fought for "Sugar Loaf Hill". The capture of these
two key positions exposed the Japanese around Shuri on both sides. Buckner hoped
to envelop Shuri and trap the main Japanese defending force.
By the end of May, monsoon rains which turned contested hills and roads into
a morass exacerbated both the tactical and medical situations. The ground
advance began to resemble a World War I battlefield as troops became mired in
mud and flooded roads greatly inhibited evacuation of wounded to the rear.
Troops lived on a field sodden by rain, part garbage dump and part graveyard.
Unburied Japanese and American bodies decayed, sank in the mud, and became part
of a noxious stew. Anyone sliding down the greasy slopes could easily find their
pockets full of maggots at the end of the journey.
On 29 May, Maj. Gen. Pedro del Valle, commanding the 1st Marine
Division, ordered Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to capture Shuri Castle.
Seizure of the castle represented both strategic and psychological blows for the
Japanese and was a milestone in the campaign. Del Valle was awarded a
Distinguished Service Medal for his leadership in the fight and the subsequent
occupation and reorganization of Okinawa. Shuri Castle had been shelled by the
battleship USS Mississippiifor three days before this advance. Due to
this, the 32nd Army withdrew to the south and thus the marines had an easy task
of securing Shuri Castle. The castle, however, was outside the 1st Marine
Division's assigned zone and only frantic efforts by the commander and staff of
the 77th Infantry Division prevented an American air strike and artillery
bombardment which would have resulted in many casualties due to friendly
fire.
The Japanese retreat, although harassed by artillery fire, was conducted
with great skill at night and aided by the monsoon storms. The 32nd Army was
able to move nearly 30,000 men into its last defense line on the Kiyan
Peninsula, which ultimately led to the greatest slaughter on Okinawa in the
latter stages of the battle, including the deaths of thousands of civilians. In
addition, there were 9,000 IJN troops supported by 1,100 militia, with
approximately 4,000 holed up at the underground headquarters on the hillside
overlooking the Okinawa Naval Base in the Oroku Peninsula, east of the airfield.
On June 4, elements of the 6th Marine Division launched an amphibious assault on
the peninsula. The 4,000 Japanese sailors? including Admiral Minoru Ota - all
committed suicide within the hand-built tunnels of the underground Naval
headquarters on 13 June. By 17 June, the remnants of Ushijima's shattered 32nd
Army were pushed into a small pocket in the far south of the island to the
southeast of Itoman. On 18 June, Gen. Buckner was killed by enemy artillery fire
while monitoring the forward progress of his troops. Buckner was replaced by Roy
Geiger. Upon assuming command, Geiger became the only U.S. Marine to command a
numbered army of the U.S. Army in combat; he was relieved five days later by
Joseph Stilwell.
The last remnants of Japanese resistance fell on 21 June, although some
Japanese continued hiding, including the future governor of Okinawa Prefecture,
Masahide Ota. Ushijima and Cho committed suicide by seppukuuin their
command headquarters on Hill 89 in the closing hours of the battle. Col. Yahara
had asked Ushijima for permission to commit suicide, but the general refused his
request, saying: "If you die there will be no one left who knows the truth about
the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order
from your army Commander." Yahara was the most senior officer to have survived
the battle on the island, and he later authored a book titled The Battle for
Okinawa.
Casualties
Okinawa was the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War. The most complete tally
of deaths during the Battle are at the Cornerstone of Peace monument at the
Okinawa Prefecture Peace Park identifies the names of each individual who died
at Okinawa due to World War II. As of 2010, the monument lists 240,931 names,
including 149,193 Okinawan civilians, 77,166 Imperial Japanese soldiers, 14,009
U.S. soldiers, and smaller numbers of people from South Korea (365), the UK
(82), North Korea (82) and Taiwan (34). The numbers correspond to recorded
deaths during the Battle of Okinawa from the time of the U.S. landings in the
Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945 to the signing of the Japanese surrender on 2
September 1945, in addition to all Okinawan casualties in the Pacific War in the
fifteen years from the Manchurian Incident, along with those who died in Okinawa
from war-related events in the year before the battle and the year after the
surrender. 234,183 names were inscribed by the time of unveiling and new names
are added each year. Thirty thousand of the Okinawan civilians killed had been
drafted or impressed by the Japanese army and are often counted as combat
deaths.
Military losses
U.S. losses
U.S. manpower losses amounted to over 82,000 casualties, including non-battle
casualties (psychiatric, injuries, illnesses) of whom over 12,500 were killed or
missing. Battle deaths were 4,907 Navy, 4,675 Army, and 2,938 Marine Corps
personnel. Several thousand servicemen who died indirectly (from wounds and
other causes) at a later date are not included in the total. One of the most
famous U.S. casualties was the war correspondent Ernie Pyle, who was killed by
Japanese sniper fire on Ie Island (Ie Shima, a small island just off of
northwestern Okinawa). Lt. Gen. Buckner's decision to attack the Japanese
defenses head-on, although extremely costly in U.S. lives, was ultimately
successful. Just four days from the closing of the campaign, Buckner was killed
by Japanese artillery fire, which blew lethal slivers of coral into his body,
while inspecting his troops at the front line. He was the highest-ranking U.S.
officer to be killed by enemy fire during the war. The day after Buckner was
killed, Brig. Gen. Claudius Miller Easley was killed by machine gun fire.
Aircraft losses over the three-month period were 768 U.S. planes, including
those bombing the Kyushu airfields launching kamikazes. Combat losses
were 458, and the other 310 were operational accidents. On land, the U.S. forces
lost at least 225 tanks and many LVTs. At sea, 368 Allied ships?including 120
amphibious craft?were damaged while another 28, including 15 amphibious ships and
12 destroyers, were sunk during the Okinawa campaign. The U.S. Navy's dead
exceeded its wounded with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from
kamikaze attacks.
The U.S. personnel casualties included thousands of cases of mental
breakdown. According to the account of the battle presented in Marine Corps
Gazette.
More mental health issues arose from the Battle of Okinawa than any other
battle in the Pacific during World War II. The constant bombardment from
artillery and mortars coupled with the high casualty rates led to a great deal
of men coming down with combat fatigue. Additionally the rains caused mud that
prevented tanks from moving and tracks from pulling out the dead, forcing
Marines (who pride themselves on burying their dead in a proper and honorable
manner) to leave their comrades where they lay. This, coupled with thousands of
bodies both friend and foe littering the entire island, created a scent you
could nearly taste. Morale was
dangerously low by the month of May and the state of discipline on a moral basis
had a new low barometer for acceptable behavior. The ruthless atrocities by the
Japanese throughout the war had already brought on an altered behavior (deemed
so by traditional standards) by many Americans resulting in the desecration of
Japanese remains, but the Japanese tactic of using the Okinawan people as human
shields brought about a new aspect of terror and torment to the psychological
capacity of the Americans.
Japanese losses
The U.S. military estimates that 110,071 Japanese soldiers were killed during
the battle. This total includes an unknown number of impressed Okinawan
civilians who were killed during the battle.
7,401 soldiers surrendered or were captured during the battle. Additional
Japanese were captured or surrendered over the next few months raising the total
to 16,346. This was the first battle in the Pacific War in which thousands of
Japanese soldiers surrendered or were captured. Many of the prisoners were
native Okinawans who had been pressed into service shortly before the battle and
were less imbued with the Imperial Japanese Army's no-surrender doctrine. When
the American forces occupied the island, many Japanese soldiers put on Okinawan
clothing to avoid capture and some Okinawans would come to the Americans' aid by
offering to detect the mainland Japanese in hiding.
The Japanese lost 16 combat vessels, including the super battleship
Yamato. Japanese aircraft losses were 7,830, including 2,655 to
operational accidents. Navy and Marine Corps fighters downed 3,047, while
shipboard anti-aircraft fire felled 409, and the B-29s destroyed 558 on the
ground. The Allies destroyed 27 Japanese tanks and 743 artillery pieces
(including mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns), some of them eliminated
by the naval and air bombardments but most of them knocked-out by American
counter-battery fire.
Civilian losses, suicides and atrocities
Some islands that saw major battles, such as Iwo Jima, were uninhabited or
previously evacuated. Okinawa, by contrast, had a large indigenous civilian
population; U.S. Army records from the planning phase of the operation make the
assumption that Okinawa was home to about 300,000 civilians. According to
various estimates, between one tenth and one third of them died during the
battle, or between 42,000 and 150,000 dead. Okinawa Prefecture's estimate is
over 100,000 losses, while the official U.S. Army count for the 82-day campaign
is a total of 142,058 civilian casualties, including those killed by artillery
fire, air attacks and those who had been pressed into service by the Imperial
Japanese Army. During the battle, U.S. soldiers found it difficult to
distinguish civilians from soldiers. It became routine for U.S. soldiers to
shoot at Okinawan houses, as one infantryman wrote, "There was some return fire
from a few of the houses, but the others were probably occupied by civilians
and we didn't care. It was a terrible thing not to distinguish between the enemy
and women and children. Americans always had great compassion, especially for
children. Now we fired indiscriminately." Since many
Okinawan residents fled to caves where they subsequently were entombed, the
precise number of civilian casualties will probably never be known.
In its history of the war, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum
presents Okinawa as being caught between in the fighting between the United
States and the Empire of Japan. During the 1945 battle, the Japanese Army showed
indifference to Okinawans' safety, and its soldiers even used civilians as human
shields against the Americans, or just outright murdered them. Japanese military
confiscated food from the Okinawans and executed those who hid it, leading to a
mass starvation among the population, and forced civilians out of their
shelters. Japanese soldiers also killed about 1,000 people who spoke in the
Okinawan language in order to suppress spying. The museum writes that "some were
blown apart by [artillery] shells, some finding themselves in a hopeless
situation were driven to suicide, some died of starvation, some succumbed to
malaria, while others fell victim to the retreating Japanese troops."
With the impending victory of American troops, civilians often committed mass
suicide, urged on by the Japanese soldiers who told locals that victorious
American soldiers would go on a rampage of killing and raping. Ryukyu
Shimpo one of the two major Okinawan newspapers, wrote in 2007: "There are
many Okinawans who have testified that the Japanese Army directed them to commit
suicide. There are also people who have testified that they were handed grenades
by Japanese soldiers" to blow themselves up. Thousands of the civilians, having
been induced by Japanese propaganda to believe that U.S. soldiers were
barbarians committing horrible atrocities, killed their families and themselves
to avoid capture. Some of them threw themselves and their family members from
the southern cliffs where the Peace Museum now resides. However, having been
told by the Japanese military that they would suffer terribly at the hands of
the arriving Americans if they allowed themselves to be taken alive, Okinawans
"were often surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from
the American enemy." Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese
and American Power by Mark Selden, notes that the Americans "did not pursue
a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military
officials had warned." U.S. Military Intelligence Corps combat translators such
as Teruto Tsubota managed to convince many civilians not to kill themselves.
Survivors of the mass suicides blamed also the indoctrination of their education
system of the time, when the Okinawans were taught to become "more Japanese than
the Japanese," and expected to prove it.
Witnesses and historians reported that soldiers on both sides had raped
Okinawan women during the battle. Rape by Japanese troops "became common" in
June, after it became clear that the Japanese Army had been defeated. Marine
Corps officials in Okinawa and Washington have said that they knew of no rapes
by American servicemen in Okinawa at the end of the war. The New York
Times, however, reported on the 1945 alleged incident in the village of
Katsuyama, where civilians said they had formed a vigilante group to ambush and
kill three black American soldiers whom they claimed would frequently rape the
local girls there.
